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Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: 
An Analysis Using Special Items 
 




This paper investigates whether presentation of special items within the financial statements 
reflects the firm’s underlying economic performance or opportunism.  We examine the 
presentation of recognized special items either as a separate line item on the income statement or 
aggregated within another line item with disclosure only in the footnotes.  Our study is motivated 
by standard-setting interest in performance reporting and financial statement presentation, as well 
as prior research investigating managers’ presentation choices in other contexts.  Using different 
constructs of persistence to capture the economics of reported special items, we find evidence 
consistent across a range of specifications that special items highlighted on the income statement 
are more transitory than those revealed only in the footnotes.  For most special items, these results 
are consistent with this presentation decision reflecting underlying firm performance.  For a subset 
observations – namely, those likely to reflect “big bath” reporting incentives – we provide limited 
evidence suggestive of opportunism in this presentation decision. 
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Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: 
An Analysis Using Special Items 
 
1.  Introduction 
  This paper investigates managers’ presentation of special items within the financial 
statements.  Specifically, we examine the use of aggregation/disaggregation within the income 
statement as a mechanism to highlight special items.  We test whether management’s decision to 
present special items either as a separate line item on the income statement (income statement 
presentation) or aggregated into another line item with identification only via footnote disclosure 
(footnote presentation) reflects informational or opportunistic motivations.  Under both 
presentation choices, the special item is recognized, i.e., reflected in net income.  By 
informational, we suggest managers use income statement presentation as a mechanism to assist 
users in better identifying and understanding the firm’s underlying performance.  In our context, 
disaggregation of special items via income statement presentation is informational when those 
special items have different economic characteristics (lower persistence) than special items that 
are aggregated with other income statement items and only disclosed via footnote presentation.  
By opportunistic, we suggest managers use this presentation decision to influence perceptions of 
the firm’s performance in a biased manner.  In our context, we examine if managers choose to 
highlight special items on the income statement to portray more favorable benchmarks of the 
firm’s performance.   
Our study is motivated by academic interest in financial statement presentation, 
particularly that examining the aggregation of line items (e.g., Dye and Sridhar 2004) and the 
characteristics of permanent versus transitory components of earnings (e.g., Brooks and 
Buckmaster 1976; Elliott and Hanna 1996).  These papers provide evidence that disaggregation of 
elements having differential implications for firm performance improves the information about the   3
firm.  In addition, our paper is motivated by standard-setter interest in performance reporting 
issues, which arises from the flexibility afforded managers in these presentation choices and the 
potential for these choices to affect users’ analysis and decisions.  This is evidenced in a joint 
project between the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) to establish common, high-quality standards for the presentation of 
information in financial statements (see FASB 2006 and IASB 2006).  Consistent with this 
perspective, prior literature provides experimental evidence that financial statement presentation 
can affect users’ judgments (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Maines and McDaniel 2000).  Our 
examination of disclosure choices regarding special items – which are typically described as “non-
recurring” items – also provides insights relevant to other current and future financial reporting 
requirements likely to introduce similar non-recurring items (such as fair value accounting).   
We choose the presentation of special items as our experimental setting for the following 
reasons.  First, special items have been shown to have differing properties relative to other 
components of income (e.g., Lipe 1986), suggesting differing presentation in financial statements 
may be warranted.  Second, they have been increasing, quite dramatically, in frequency and 
magnitude over time (e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996; see also Appendix A), thus becoming a 
significant component of income for many firms.  Third, they are heterogeneous across a number 
of characteristics (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 
2002), providing cross-sectional variation that we exploit in our empirical examination.  Finally, 
we conjecture that special items provide a strong setting for examining motivations underlying 
managers’ financial statement presentation choices, as the reporting of special items typically 
reflects substantial inherent uncertainty (e.g., the success of a restructuring) and measurement 
error (e.g., estimation of impaired goodwill).    4
Our empirical tests use detailed hand-collected data spanning the period 1993-2002 for a 
random sample of 500 firms within the S&P 1500.  Data are collected to enable measurement of 
both the specific composition of the reported special items as well as the related financial 
statement presentation choice.  We observe considerable variation in the income statement versus 
footnote presentation choices – both across and within firms.  To disentangle informational versus 
opportunistic motivations for presentation of special items, our analyses focus on an ex post 
measure of the special item’s economic content: the persistence of the special item.  Overall, we 
find evidence consistent across a range of specifications that managers choose to highlight on the 
income statement special items that are more transitory than those revealed only in the footnotes.  
For most special items, these results are consistent with the presentation decision reflecting 
informational motivations.  However, for a subset of observations – in particular, those likely to 
reflect “big bath” reporting incentives – we provide limited evidence that opportunistic 
motivations underlie this presentation decision.   
Our paper contributes to the accounting literature in four primary ways.  First, we build on 
prior research examining managers’ reporting behavior in other types of financial reporting 
presentation choices, particularly that investigating pro forma reporting (e.g., Schrand and Walther 
2000; Bhattacharya et al. 2003).  These studies generally conclude that managers act 
opportunistically in their reporting decisions.  While we provide limited evidence consistent with 
opportunism, our overall results suggest that managers appear to apply their presentation decisions 
in a manner consistent with informational motivations, particularly in the absence of “big bath” 
reporting incentives (i.e., for the majority or reported special items).
1  Second, our insights 
complement experimental findings that presentation choices affect user judgments (e.g., Hirst and 
                                                 
1   While we focus on the presentation choice, our findings complement other research investigating informational 
versus opportunistic motivations in the recognition of reported items (e.g., Aboody 1996; Aboody, Barth, and 
Kasznik 2004; and Hodder et al. 2006).   5
Hopkins 1998) by suggesting linkages between observed management presentation behavior and 
the consequences of this behavior.  Third, we build on prior research documenting differential 
persistence across the sign of special items (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002) by 
showing that differences in persistence exist even within categories of special items.  Finally, we 
complement prior descriptive evidence (e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996) by documenting a continued 
increase in the frequency and magnitude of reported special items.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses related prior 
research, motivation, and our hypothesis development.  Section 3 presents the research design.  
Section 4 discusses our sample selection and descriptive data.  Section 5 presents our empirical 
results.  Section 6 provides sensitivity analyses.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Prior Research, Motivation, and Hypothesis Development 
Prior Research and Motivation 
Prior literature on management disclosure (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001) suggests that 
disclosure decisions reflect both informational motivations (that is, managers use these decisions 
to inform financial statement users about the underlying economics of their firms) and 
opportunistic motivations (that is, managers use these decisions to bias users’ perspectives).  In 
this study, we focus on management choice of presentation within the financial statements as a 
disclosure medium.  Thus, we examine managers’ choice to present separately (and therefore 
highlight) certain elements within the financial statements, a notion that relates to the literature on 
aggregation of performance measures (e.g., Dye and Sridhar 2004).   
Prior research on disclosure choices to emphasize financial performance metrics has 
generally focused on alternative settings, particularly pro forma reporting.  A number of papers   6
provide evidence consistent with management reporting in this context reflecting opportunism.  
Schrand and Walther (2000) examines earnings press releases, and documents that managers are 
more likely to separately announce a prior-period gain from the sale of assets than a loss, 
consistent with managers opportunistically selecting the prior-period earnings amount used as a 
benchmark to evaluate current-period earnings.  Weiss (2001) examines the reporting effects of 
the 1993 change in corporate income tax rates, and similarly finds that managers are more likely to 
separately disclose negative than positive non-recurring items in press releases, consistent with 
managers attempting to highlight the negative items as transitory or non-core expenses.  McVay 
(2006) provides similar evidence, documenting that managers opportunistically shift reported 
expenses from core expenses (such as cost of goods sold) to special items, thereby overstating 
“core” earnings.  Taken together, these papers suggest that managers use certain presentation 
decisions – particularly in the context of “pro forma” reporting – in an opportunistic fashion.
2   
Other research provides evidence that “pro forma” reporting reflects elements of both 
underlying economic performance and opportunistic behavior.  Lougee and Marquardt (2004) 
finds that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma 
earnings consistent with motivations to accurately reflect the firm’s performance; however, the 
direction of the GAAP earnings surprise is also an important determinant of this decision, 
consistent with opportunistic motivations.  Similarly, Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2005) 
provides evidence that managers emphasize metrics that portray more favorable firm performance; 
however, these same metrics are also more value relevant.  
                                                 
2   While several studies provide evidence that investors are misled, at least temporarily, by such opportunistic 
presentation behavior (e.g., Schrand and Walther 2000), some research concludes otherwise (e.g., Johnson and 
Schwartz 2005).  Bhattacharya et al. (2007) reveals that less sophisticated investors react to such pro forma 
disclosures, suggesting consideration of investor type may partially reconcile these differing conclusions.   7
In the current paper, we examine managers’ direct presentation decisions within the 
financial statements, which have received scant empirical investigation.  Prior experimental 
research in other financial statement presentation contexts (such as the reporting of comprehensive 
income) reveals that such presentation choices can affect the costs to users to identify, interpret, 
and weigh the implications of reported items for the firm (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Maines 
and McDaniel 2000; Elliott 2006).  Thus, similar to the literature on pro forma reporting, we 
examine a management presentation decision – i.e., the extent to which management chooses to 
highlight reporting elements within the financial statements. 
As our setting, we focus on managers’ presentation of special items.  Accounting 
Principles Board 30 – Reporting the Results of Operations defines special items as charges that 
are infrequent or unusual in nature.
3  We choose special items as our setting for the following 
reasons.  First, proper identification and labeling of this type of charge is likely relevant for 
financial statement users, as these items may have differing properties from other components of 
earnings (e.g., Lipe 1986; Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn 1996; Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002).  Second, special items have increased dramatically in 
frequency and magnitude over recent years (e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996; our Appendix A).  
Further, special items represent reporting events where opportunities to inform or bias perceptions 
through presentation choice are likely exacerbated, owing to the high uncertainty (such as the 
success of a restructuring endeavor) and challenging measurement issues (such as estimating an 
impairment) that typically surround special items.  Finally, there are no rigid guidelines regarding 
the presentation of such items, except that they must be included in operating income.  Thus, 
                                                 
3   Related, note that our analysis excludes discontinued operations, extraordinary items, and effects of changes in 
accounting principle.  All three qualify for specific treatment under US GAAP: each must be disclosed separately, 
net of applicable taxes, on the income statement below income from continuing operations.   8
managers have discretion over how special items are presented on the income statement.
4  In 
particular, managers may present special items in one of two ways: as a separate line item on the 
income statement with possible discussion in the footnotes (i.e., income statement presentation), 
or aggregated within another line item on the income statement with identification and discussion 
of the special items only via the footnotes (i.e., footnote presentation).  Again, in both cases the 
special items are recognized – i.e., reflected in net income.  The choice is the extent to which 
management highlights these items on the face of the income statement. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
Applying the findings of prior research, we propose that management presentation of 
special items within the income statement reflects two notions.  First, managers may use the 
presentation choice to provide users with information on the underlying economic characteristics 
of these items (i.e., informational motivations).  In the context of special items, highlighting such 
charges via separate presentation on the income statement suggests that these items have differing 
properties, such as implications for future performance, than other income statement elements.  
However, because separate presentation can suggest different properties of the income statement 
item, managers may alternatively use the presentation choice to bias users’ perceptions of 
performance (i.e., opportunistic motivations).  In the context of special items, such opportunism 
could manifest through managers using presentation to inflate performance measures such as core 
                                                 
4    While we explicitly incorporate the magnitude of the special item into our research design, we are unaware of any 
rules imposing an income statement presentation requirement based on materiality.  Firms are required to 
“identify” (i.e., disclose) all material events; however, they have discretion in the presentation decision as it relates 
to the financial statements, including the income statement.  As an example, the SEC raised questions to IBM 
regarding its 1999 annual report, in which IBM aggregated a $4.06 billion gain from the sale of a subsidiary, which 
was identified in the footnotes but presented as an offsetting item within SG&A on the income statement.  
However, the matter was subsequently dropped, and IBM was not required to amend its filings (Bulkely 2002).    9
earnings.  Thus, we examine whether management presentation of special items reflects 
informational or opportunistic motivations, on average.   
To disentangle these motivations, we will use the persistence of reported special items to 
discern their economic content.  Accordingly, informational motivations will be evidenced by 
income statement (footnote) presentation of special items that are more transitory (persistent) in 
nature.  Conversely, opportunistic motivations will be evidenced by income statement (footnote) 
presentation of special items that are more persistent (transitory) in nature.  Thus, we will provide 
evidence on whether the disaggregation of special items (reflected in their income statement 
presentation) is justified relative to the aggregation of special items (reflected in their footnote 
presentation) by examining the relative persistence of these two groups of special items to assess 
their economic content.    
However, persistence can only partially disentangle whether informational versus 
opportunistic motivations underlie the presentation of special items.  In particular, opportunism 
can affect both the presentation and recognition of special items.  Regarding the latter, prior 
research provides evidence that “big bath” reporting incentives affect the recognition of special 
items (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Riedl 2004), which may create a competing 
inference regarding the use of persistence.  Specifically, under “big bath” reporting, managers 
recognize excessive negative special items.  These are likely to both receive income statement 
presentation (as managers likely wish to frame such charges as non-recurring) and be transitory (as 
the charges are economically excessive).  Thus, for those special items likely to reflect “big bath” 
reporting incentives, persistence can only partially disentangle the motivations underlying this 
presentation.
5   
                                                 
5   In this discussion, we focus on “big bath” reporting of special items, as other incentives to recognize special items 
(such as income smoothing) do not lead to competing explanations regarding our persistence measure.   10
However, such incentives likely occur only in a particular portion of the distribution of 
reported special items.  Accordingly, we address this potential competing explanation by 
decomposing observations into those likely to reflect “big bath” reporting incentives, and those 
unlikely to reflect these incentives.  We define “big bath” observations as those having the 
following characteristics.  First, the firm must report both net negative special items and large 
negative special items, as “big bath” behavior should reflect net income-decreasing charges that 
are substantial.  Second, the firm must have missed an important earnings benchmark, as “big 
bath” behavior reflects reporting of income that falls below some performance threshold (Riedl 
2004).  Thus, while the inferences regarding “big bath” observations (which represent 
approximately 20% of our sample) may remain unclear, inferences regarding “non-big bath” 
observations (which represent approximately 80% of our sample) should be unaffected by any 
alternative explanation.  
 
3.  Research Design 
  Our research design employs two primary tests.  First, we model the determinants of the 
presentation of special items.  Second, we examine whether the persistence of special items varies 
across the presentation decision.  Consistent with the above discussion, for both analyses we also 
separately examine “big bath” versus “non-big bath” observations to better identify special items 
where informational versus opportunistic motivations are more likely to occur.  
 
Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items 
We use the following model to examine the determinants of management’s presentation of 
special items separately on the income statement (income statement presentation) versus   11
aggregated into another line item with identification only via footnote disclosure (footnote 
presentation): 
 SI_Sepjt = δ0 + δ1YEAR t + δ2SIZEjt + δ3INSTjt + δ4SI_MAGjt 
       + δ5SI_PERSISTjt + δ6NSIjt + δ7MISS_PYEjt + δ8BEAT_PYEjt + φjt   (1)  
We estimate this model under two specifications.  First, under an OLS specification, we define 
SI_Sep as the percentage of special items reported within a separate line item on the income 
statement for firm j in fiscal year t.  This is measured as the absolute amount of special items 
identified in a separate line item on the income statement, divided by the absolute amount of total 
reported special items; thus, the variable ranges in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.  Note that positive 
(i.e., income-increasing) and negative (i.e., income-decreasing) special items are not netted in this 
calculation.
6  Second, since our dependent variable has significant clustering at the end points of 
its distribution, we also examine a logistic specification.  Here, we define SI_Sep as an indicator 
variable equal to 1 when any reported special items receive income statement presentation, and 0 
when all reported special items receive footnote presentation.  This is akin to suggesting that the 
highlighting of any special item serves as a “red flag” for users to look for other related items.    
Our model includes four control variables.  First, we include YEAR (the year) as the 
likelihood of presenting special items separately on the income statement may be changing over 
time; for example, pro forma reporting increased over our sample period (e.g., Bradshaw and 
Sloan 2002).  Second, we include SIZE (the log of firm j’s year t sales) to control for differing 
investing and information environments across variously sized firms on the presentation decision.  
                                                 
6    For example, consider a firm having a $40 write-off and $10 gain in year 19XX.  If the firm reports both items 
separately on the income statement, then SI_Sep = 1 (50/50).  If the firm reports only the write-off separately, with 
the gain aggregated within another line item, then SI_Sep = .80 (40/50).  If the firm reports only the gain 
separately, with the write-off aggregated, then SI_Sep = 0.20 (10/50).  If the firm aggregates both items within 
other line items, then SI_Sep = 0 (0/50).  Thus, we consider all special items as absolute amounts individually to 
define SI_Sep, as netting may obscure presentation differences, particularly across positive/negative special items.   12
Third, we include INST (the percentage of firm j’s common shares outstanding owned by 
institutions at the end of year t, measured using Spectrum), with institutional owners representing 
sophisticated users, which may affect this presentation decision.  However, the effects of YEAR, 
SIZE and INST on this presentation are unclear ex ante; accordingly, we do not predict a sign for 
δ1, δ2, or δ3.  Finally, we include SI_MAG (firm j’s total reported special items divided by total 
assets at the beginning of year t), as the likelihood of reporting special items as a separate line item 
should be increasing in the magnitude of the special item, consistent with materiality affecting 
management presentation decisions.  Thus, the predicted sign for δ4 is positive. 
We then include four experimental variables.  Of primary interest, we first examine if the 
economic characteristics of the reported special items affect the presentation decision.  This seems 
warranted, as standard-setter interest regarding the interpretation of income statement reporting 
elements surrounds the correct weighting users should apply with respect to predicting future 
performance (FASB 1980).  Accordingly, we use as an economic characteristic the special items’ 
ability to predict the firm’s future performance, thus applying an ex post measure to assess the 
economic content of the reported special item.  To capture future performance, we use the firm’s 
one-year ahead earnings (before special items) for the following reasons.  First, future earnings is 
a key performance measure for valuation.  Second, prior research suggests that special items have 
serial correlation (e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996; Arner 2004), and may affect other components 
(including “recurring” components) of net income.  Finally, we use one-year ahead earnings as 
any continuing economic implications of reported special items, while potentially affecting 
multiple future periods, are likely to manifest in the immediately subsequent period.   
Accordingly, we include SI_PERSIST, measured as follows.  We estimate regressions of 
earnings before special items for year t+1 on earnings before special items for year t and special   13
items for year t.  We use all available data from Compustat, estimating annual regressions for each 
3-digit SIC industry, which will capture the economics of similar firms in similar time periods.  
Thus, SI_PERSIST reflects the observed coefficient on special items, i.e., the vector of the year-
industry persistence parameters for special items.
7  
Recall that we wish to identify whether the presentation decision reflects informational 
versus opportunistic motivations, on average.  Regarding SI_PERSIST, informational motivations 
would suggest that managers use income statement presentation to highlight those special items 
that are more transitory in nature, and footnote presentation for those special items that are more 
likely to having recurring (i.e., persistent) implications for firm performance.  That is, 
disaggregation of special items via income statement presentation is informational when those 
special items have different economic characteristics (lower persistence) than special items that 
are aggregated with other income statement items and disclosed via footnote presentation.  Thus, 
under informational motivations, we would expect the manager to provide income statement 
(footnote) presentation for those special items that are economically more transitory (persistent) in 
nature, leading to a predicted negative sign for δ5.   
In contrast, opportunistic motivations in this presentation decision likely reflect incentives 
(such as capital market pressures to meet particular benchmarks) for managers to inflate current 
                                                 
7   That is, we estimate the following regression by industry i and year t:  E*jt+1 = λ0 + λ1E*jt + λ2SIjt + νjt 
 where  E*jt+1 (E*jt) is earnings before special items for firm j for year t+1 (year t), and SIjt is reported special items 
per Compustat for firm j for year t.  All variables are scaled by beginning market value of equity.  Thus, 
SI_PERSIST is the vector consisting of i X t estimates of λ2 obtained from the industry-year regressions.   
    We use Compustat data to obtain this variable, versus our smaller sample of hand-collected special items 
data, in order to increase the sample size.  Thus, in the current analysis we estimate the regressions cross-
sectionally within a year, instead of in a time-series within a firm.  Alternatively, we could estimate firm level 
parameters.  However, the relative infrequency of reporting special items for any individual firm across our 10-year 
sample period makes it impractical to compute firm-specific estimates of the parameter on special items.  Note, for 
industry-years having less than 20 observations, we aggregate to the 2-digit SIC level.   
    Results are unchanged using alternative specifications to obtain SI_PERSIST (e.g., defining the dependent 
variable as earnings versus earnings before special items; obtaining coefficients at the 2-digit SIC level; 
winsorizing the distribution of special items parameters).       14
period core earnings.
8  If managers wish to artificially inflate core earnings, they would provide 
income statement presentation for any special item that reduces net income, attempting to 
highlight these as transitory regardless of their economic content.  Similarly, managers would 
provide footnote presentation for any special items that increase net income, attempting to 
designate these as persistent regardless of their economic content.  That is, disaggregation of 
special items via income statement presentation is opportunistic when those special items have 
different economic characteristics (higher persistence) than special items that are aggregated with 
other income statement items and disclosed via footnote presentation.  Thus, under opportunistic 
motivations, we would expect the manager to provide income statement (footnote) presentation for 
those special items that are economically more persistent (transitory) in nature, leading to a 
predicted positive sign for δ5.   
Next, we argue that the effect of the special item on net income (i.e., whether it is a 
positive special item (PSI) or negative special item (NSI)) affects this presentation decision.  
Accordingly, we include NSI, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative special 
items, and 0 otherwise.  Prior research suggests NSI are more transitory than PSI (Burgstahler, 
Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002), and are more likely to be separately presented on the income 
statement (Kinney and Trezevant 1997) and in press releases (Weiss 2001), suggesting a positive 
predicted sign for δ6.
9  However, management may wish to downplay income-decreasing special 
items (i.e., “bad news” such as write-offs), suggesting NSI are less likely to receive income 
statement presentation than PSI (i.e., a negative predicted sign for δ6).  Thus, we do not predict the 
sign on δ6.  Note, too, that informational versus opportunistic motivations cannot be disentangled 
                                                 
8   We do not examine particular contracting incentives (e.g., compensation like bonus thresholds, or debt restrictions 
like covenants), as presentation is unlikely to affect calculations embedded in such contracts. 
9   While Kinney and Trezevant (1997) documents that NSI are more likely to be shown on the face of the income 
statement than PSI, the paper applies only a univariate analysis on a limited sample of firms.   15
with this coefficient; nonetheless, a positive (negative) coefficient for δ6 is consistent with 
management being more likely to present NSI (PSI) as a separate line item. 
Finally, we include two proxies to directly examine whether opportunistic motivations 
underlie the presentation decision.  Both focus on whether the special item causes the firm to miss 
or beat prior year’s earnings, as prior research documents that benchmarks affect the recognition 
of special items (e.g., Riedl 2004) and their presentation in press releases (e.g., Schrand and 
Walther 2000; Lougee and Marquardt 2004).  We use prior year’s earnings measured before 
special items and extraordinary items (i.e., “operating earnings”) as a benchmark, versus other 
constructs such as consensus earnings forecasts, as there is variation in how analysts 
include/exclude special items in their forecasts (e.g., Gu and Chen 2004).  Accordingly, we first 
include MISS_PYE, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the reported special items cause operating 
earnings to all below prior year operating earnings, and 0 otherwise.  The predicted sign for δ7 is 
positive, as management would wish to highlight that such an item is transitory, and thus should 
not be considered a part of current year’s “core earnings.”  We then include BEAT_PYE, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the reported special items cause operating earnings to be above 
prior year operating earnings, and 0 otherwise.  The predicted sign for δ8 is negative, as 
management would wish to de-emphasize that beating prior year’s earnings is attributable to a 
current year special item (similar to Schrand and Walther 2000).  Note that each variable captures 
specific distributions of the (net) NSI and PSI, respectively.  For example, while all NSI reduce 
earnings by definition, only a subset of firms reporting NSI will miss prior year’s earnings as a 
direct result of reporting the NSI.  Similarly, while all PSI increase earnings by definition, only a 
subset of firms reporting PSI will beat prior year’s earnings as a direct result of reporting the PSI.     16
  Consistent with our previous discussion, we first apply Equation (1) to the full sample, and 
then separately to the sub-samples of “big bath” and “non-big bath” observations.  We define “big 
bath” observations as those with all of the following characteristics: report net negative special 
items; report “large” negative special items (defined, consistent with prior research, as total 
negative special items exceeding 1% of lagged total assets – see Elliott and Shaw 1988, and Elliott 
and Hanna 1996); and that miss prior year’s earnings due to the special item.  Because “non-big 
bath” observations should be unaffected by “big bath” incentives to recognize special items, this 
sub-sample should provide the cleanest inferences regarding informational versus opportunistic 
motivations for the presentation decision.   
 
Presentation of Special Items and Earnings Persistence 
In the previous analysis, we measure persistence of the special items at an average (i.e., 
industry) level.  We now alternatively employ the following analysis examining the presentation 
of special items and earnings persistence (similar to Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002), 
which allows a more direct measure of firm-level persistence of reported special items: 
Ejt+1 = α0 + α1E*jt + α2SI_ISjt + α3SI_FNjt + γjt      ( 2 )  
Ejt+1 is earnings for firm j for year t+1.  E*jt is earnings before special items for firm j for year t.  
SI_ISjt is special items receiving income statement presentation for firm j for year t.  SI_FNjt is 
special items receiving footnote presentation firm j for year t.  For this analysis we use signed 
(versus absolute) special item amounts.
10  All variables are scaled by market value of equity at the 
beginning of year t.   
                                                 
10  Equation (1) uses absolute special items to avoid netting in the context of the presentation decision.  The current 
analysis of Equation (2) uses signed special items, which better reflects their mapping into future performance.   17
This analysis examines the predictive content of current period earnings and special items 
for future (one-period ahead) earnings; thus, we again use an ex post measure of future 
performance to assess the economic content (that is, the persistence) of the reported special item.  
If managers correctly ex ante identify those special items that are economically more transitory, 
and emphasize them via income statement presentation, informational motivations predict α2 < α3.  
Alternatively, if managers use income statement presentation to highlight as transitory those 
special items that economically are more persistent, opportunistic motivations predict α2 > α3. 
To again better disentangle the informational versus opportunistic motivations, we 
incorporate the “big bath” reporting incentive into Equation (2) by estimating the following: 
Ejt+1 = β0 + β1E*jt + β2SI_ISjt + β3SI_FNjt + β4SI_IS_BATHjt + β5SI_FN_BATHjt + θjt      (2a) 
SI_IS_BATH (SI_FN_BATH) are special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation 
for those observations likely to reflect “big bath” reporting incentives.  We define “big bath” 
observations as in Equation (1).  All other variables are as defined in Equation (2).  While it is 
unclear whether informational versus opportunistic motivations can be disentangled for the “big 
bath” observations (i.e., β4 and β5), the inference should be unambiguous for the “non-big bath” 
observations (i.e., β2 and β3). 
While we expect consistency across our two analyses, Equation (2) may have less 
measurement error in the sense that it takes the presentation of special items (which is directly 
observable) as given, and estimates the “persistence” parameter (which is not directly observable).  
Thus, it estimates the effect of presentation on persistence.  In contrast, the Equation (1) design 
takes persistence as given, and estimates the “presentation” parameter (i.e., estimates the effect of 
persistence on presentation).  Use of both methods should provide additional robustness to our 
inferences.   18
 
4.  Sample Selection and Descriptive Data 
  To allow for a richer analysis, we derive a sample of firms to obtain a full decomposition 
of reported special items (see Table 1).  We first identify all firm-years falling within the S&P 
1500 during the period 1993 – 2002.  Our restriction to this subset enables us to capture a broad 
cross-section of firms while focusing our analysis on a relatively large proportion of U.S. market 
capitalization.  Due to the cost of hand-collection of data, we randomly choose 500 firms from 
among all firms that fall within the S&P 1500 during our sample period.  We include all available 
firm-years for these firms within the sample period, resulting in a sample of 4,695 firms-years.
11   
We then hand-collect and categorize all special items using the firm’s 10-Ks, annual 
reports, and/or 10-Qs.  Our collection includes performing key word searches within electronic 
source documents, as well as scanning management discussion and analysis, the financial 
statements, and footnotes for indications of special items, regardless of whether Compustat reports 
that the firm has a special item.  We also collect the presentation of special items (income 
statement or footnote presentation) in the aggregate, by the sign of the special item, and within 
each of three categories (restructuring, write-offs, and other).
12, 13  
  Table 2 provides descriptive data for our sample.  The average firm-year has total assets of 
$8.4 billion, consistent with our selection criteria focusing on S&P 1500 firms.  Over half of the 
observations report special items (2,412 out of 4,695, or 51%).  Of those reporting special items, 
slightly more than half report large special items (1,279 out of 2,412, or 53%), and only negative 
                                                 
11  Various analyses use a subset of the 4,695 observations; these are noted where appropriate. 
12  Reiterating our motivation for hand-collecting this data: during our sample period, Compustat does not identify the 
category of the special item, nets positive and negative special items together, and does not provide information on 
the format of the special item’s presentation within the financial statements. 
13  Restructuring charges include employee severance, facility closing, other, and restructuring reversals.  Write-offs 
include write-offs of goodwill, intangibles, PP&E, investments, oil and gas properties, software, leases, inventory, 
and other.  Other includes gains on settlements (both legal and insurance charges), losses on settlements, in-process 
R&D, gains on sales of assets, losses on sales of assets, merger related costs, and other.     19
special items (1,452 out of 2,412, or 60%).  Special items are distributed widely across the three 
primary categories of restructuring charges (46% of observations reporting special items), write-
offs (34%), and other (71%).
14  Finally, there is substantial variation in firms’ presentation of 
special items, with 55% (1,335 out of 2,412) presenting all special items as separate line items on 
the income statement, 30% aggregating all special items in other line items on the income 
statement with identification only via footnote disclosure, and 15% adopting mixed presentation.  
Note that our analyses focus on this variation in the presentation decision, as reflected in the 
bottom three rows and last two columns of Table 2.  
 
5.  Empirical Results  
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results  
  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used to examine the determinants of 
income statement versus footnote presentation of special items.  This sample focuses on those 
observations reporting special items and having available data for Equation (1) (N = 2,228).  Panel 
A presents means and medians for the regression variables.  Special items are typically reported as 
a separate line item on the income statement (mean of SI_Sep = 0.646), and on average represent 
approximately 5% of beginning total assets (mean of SI_MAG = 0.048).  Special items have an 
average persistence (SI_PERSIST) of 0.21, and 86% of observations reporting special items report 
a negative special item (NSI = 0.859).  Almost 21% of observations report negative special items 
that result in the firm missing prior year’s earnings (MISS_PYE = 0.208), while only 4% report 
positive special items that result in the firm beating prior year’s earnings (BEAT_PYE = 0.039).  
This latter is consistent with the generally conservative nature of how special items are reported – 
leading to a higher frequency (and concurrent greater impact on benchmarks) of negative than 
                                                 
14  The percentages do not sum to 100%, as a firm may report multiple categories of special items in any given year.   20
positive special items (see, for example, Basu 1997).  Panel B presents Pearson correlations, with 
univariate associations generally consistent with our previously discussed predictions. 
Table 4 presents univariate comparisons of observations reporting special items under 
income statement versus footnote presentation; for expositional convenience, we present results 
only for the magnitude of special items (SI_MAG) and our key construct for economic 
performance, the persistence of special items (SI_PERSIST).  The table provides several insights.  
Panel A, examining all observations with necessary data (N = 2,228), reveals that special items 
receiving income statement presentation are larger in magnitude (e.g., SI_MAG mean of 0.062 
versus 0.015) and less persistent (SI_PERSIST of 0.181 versus 0.304).  Panels B and C decompose 
the sample into observations likely to reflect “big bath” reporting incentives (N = 406) and those 
unlikely to reflect these incentives (N = 1,822).  In Panel B, within the subset of “big bath” 
observations, larger special items are more likely to receive income statement presentation 
(SI_MAG mean of 0.101 versus 0.054), but differences in persistence are insignificant 
(SI_PERSIST mean of 0.135 versus 0.251).  In Panel C, within the subset of “non-big bath” 
observations, special items presented on the income statement are again larger (SI_MAG of 0.051 
versus 0.011), as well as less persistent (SI_PERSIST of 0.199 versus 0.309).  For the latter 
observations, this provides preliminary evidence that this presentation decision reflects 
informational motivations, as incentives to distort (i.e., “big bath” reporting incentives) are 
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Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items 
  Table 5 presents results from OLS analyses examining the determinants of management’s 
decision to present special items as a separate line item on the income statement.  Focusing on all 
observations (column 1, N = 2,228), of our control variables, SIZE is negatively associated with 
this decision, consistent with larger firms being less likely to separately present special items.  In 
addition, the coefficient on INST is significantly positive, consistent with managers being more 
likely to separately present special items as institutional ownership increases.
15  Finally, SI_MAG 
is positively associated with this decision, consistent with materiality affecting the presentation 
decision, as larger special items are more likely to receive income statement presentation.  The 
coefficient on YEAR is negative and insignificant.
16   
Regarding our experimental variables, SI_PERSIST is negative and significant as predicted 
(coefficient = –0.03, t-statistic = –2.89), indicating managers are more likely to provide income 
statement presentation for those special items having lower persistence.  This is consistent with 
managers being able to identify more transitory special items ex ante, and using income statement 
presentation to identify transitory versus recurring reporting items (i.e., for informational 
motivations).  In addition, NSI is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.12, t-statistic = 4.32), 
indicating that ceteris paribus managers are more likely to present negative special items 
separately on the income statement than positive special items.  Of the reporting incentive 
variables, only MISS_PYE is significantly positive as predicted (coefficient = 0.14, t-statistic = 
5.78), indicating that managers are more likely to provide income statement presentation for 
                                                 
15  We alternatively include analyst following as a proxy for demand for transparent information, which also obtains a 
significant positive coefficient.  The other variables are unchanged. 
16  Alternative specifications to control for temporal effects reveal similar results.  First, we drop YEAR and instead 
include year fixed-effects; inferences are unchanged.  Second, we drop YEAR and estimate ten annual regressions 
(i.e., a Fama-Macbeth approach).  Inferences are unchanged, with adjusted t-statistics as follows: SIZE = -3.68; 
INST = 4.83; SI_MAG = 4.22; SI_PERSIST = -1.95; NSI = 3.24; MISS_PYE = 6.19; and BEAT_PYE = 0.65.     22
special items that cause current year’s earnings to fall below previous year’s earnings.  This is 
consistent with managers using income statement presentation to highlight negative special items 
that affect a relevant earnings benchmark (i.e., for opportunistic motivations).  However, 
BEAT_PYE is not significant and obtains the opposite to predicted sign.   
The above results reveal that special items presented on the income statement are more 
transitory than those presented in the footnotes.  This is consistent with the presentation choice 
reflecting informational motivations, that is, to better highlight for users those items having lower 
persistence.  However, observations in which “big bath” reporting incentives may exist have a 
competing explanation: that managers are misreporting (i.e., recognizing) special items, calling 
into question our use of persistence to distinguish informational versus opportunistic motivations 
across all observations.  Accordingly, we now conduct analyses focusing on subsets of 
observations likely to reflect “big bath” incentives versus those unlikely to reflect such incentives 
to better isolate the motivations underlying this presentation decision.  Columns (2) and (3) 
present OLS results for these two subsamples.   
Focusing on the “big bath” observations (N = 406), column (2) reveals similar inferences 
for the control variables as revealed for all observations.  However, the experimental variable 
SI_PERSIST is insignificant (–0.03, t-statistic = –1.27).  Note that this analysis excludes the 
variables NSI, MISS_PYE, and BEAT_PYE, as there is no variation in these variables due to the 
sub-sample definition (e.g., all observations have NSI).  Turning to the “non-big bath” 
observations (N = 1,822), column (3) again reveals results for the control variables that are similar 
to those presented for all observations.  Of the experimental variables, only SI_PERSIST (–0.03, t-
statistic = –2.47) and NSI (0.12, t-statistic = 4.03) are significant.  Interestingly, neither of the 
incentive variables are significant (MISS_PYE, t-statistic = –0.34; BEAT_PYE, t-statistic = 1.63).    23
If this subsample reasonably identifies observations unlikely to be affected by “big bath” reporting 
incentives, the latter results are consistent with the presentation decision for this subset of special 
items reflecting informational motivations.   
Table 6 presents results using a logistic specification applied to the full sample (column 1), 
the “big bath” sample (column 2), and the “non-big bath” sample (column 3).  Results are 
unchanged from those discussed for the OLS specification above.  In addition, untabulated results 
are unchanged estimating a second logistic specification, defining the dependent variable, SI_Sep, 
as an indicator variable equal to 1 if management provides income statement presentation for all 
reported special items, and 0 if management provides footnote presentation for all reported special 
items (i.e., excluding observations having a mixed presentation). 
 
Presentation of Special Items and Earnings Persistence 
Table 7 presents results from analyses examining the presentation of special items on the 
income statement and earnings persistence.  Column (1) provides a benchmark, revealing that 
special items (SIt) have lower persistence than earnings before special items (E*t) in predicting 
one-year ahead earnings, consistent with prior research (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 
2002) (untabulated results indicate the difference is significant at the less than 1% level).  Column 
(2) reveals that special items presented in the footnotes (SI_FNt) are more persistent (coefficient = 
0.26) than those receiving income statement presentation (SI_ISt) (coefficient = 0.09) (F-value on 
difference = 8.16).  This is consistent with the presentation decision reflecting informational 
motivations, as those special items receiving income statement (footnote) presentation are more 
transitory (persistent).     24
Column (3) presents results incorporating the effects of the “big bath” observations.  For 
the baseline observations – that is, “non-big bath” observations unlikely to reflect “big bath” 
incentives – special items receiving income statement presentation (SI_IS = 0.09) are less 
persistent than those receiving footnote presentation (SI_FN = 0.18), with a difference that is 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.10; F-statistic = 1.48).  Because these observations should be 
unaffected by “big bath” incentives, these results are consistent with managers using the 
presentation decision of special items for informational motivations.  For the “big bath” 
observations, the table also reveals that special items receiving income statement presentation 
(SI_IS_BATH = 0.04) are less persistent than those receiving footnote presentation (SI_FN_BATH 
= 0.21), with a difference that is again statistically significant (p-value = 0.09; F-statistic = 1.68).  
Because the “big bath” observations may reflect bias in the recognition of the reported special 
items, we are unable to disentangle opportunism versus informational motivations for these 
observations.   
 
6.  Sensitivity Analyses  
  In this section, we conduct several sensitivity analyses to validate our results.  First, we 
partition on the magnitude of special items.  Second, we examine partitions on the sign and 
category of special items.  Third, we examine an alternative disclosure context: press releases.  
Finally, we conduct analyses on several subsamples.   
 
Partitioning on the Magnitude of Special Items 
  Table 8 presents results for analyses partitioning the sample into large and small special 
items.  This analysis is warranted, if our previous decomposition of the sample into “big bath” and   25
“non-big bath” observations does not fully capture observations affected by “big bath” reporting 
incentives.  Thus, the “large” designation will capture any observation reporting substantial special 
items (i.e., having “big bath” incentives).  In contrast, small special items should be unaffected by 
these incentives.  Consistent with prior research (e.g., Elliott and Hanna 1996), we define large 
(small) special items as those in aggregate that are greater than or equal to (less than) 1% of lagged 
total assets.  Note, that small special items remain material enough to be identified by 
management, and on average are 0.4% (approximately 10%) of the firm’s beginning assets (net 
income) (see Table 2).   
Panel A presents results for Equation (1), examining the determinants of the decision to 
present special items on the income statement.  Focusing on the experimental variables, column 
(2) for the “large special items” observations reveals that our proxy for economic content, 
SI_PERSIST, is negative but insignificant (–0.01, t-statistic = –0.74) and the one proxy for 
reporting incentives, MISS_PYE, is positive and significant (0.06, t-statistic = 2.52).  The other 
experimental variables are insignificant.  Under column (3) for the “small special items” 
observations, SI_PERSIST is significantly negative (–0.05, t-statistic = –2.82), and NSI (0.07, t-
statistic = 1.75) is also marginally significant.  The other experimental variables are insignificant.  
These results confirm our earlier findings, as the presentation of small special items appears to 
reflect informational motivations evidenced in the variable SI_PERSIST.  In contrast, the large 
special items reflect some evidence of opportunism, evidenced in the variable MISS_PYE. 
Panel B presents results for Equation (2), examining the presentation of special items and 
earnings persistence.
17  Columns (1) and (2) provide baseline regressions, with results similar to 
those presented in Table 7.  Columns (3) and (4) present results for large (N = 1,016) and small (N 
                                                 
17  Note for this estimation, we exclude observations reporting no special items (whereas in Table 7 these are 
included).  This exclusion is done to simplify the decomposition of the sample into large and small special items 
observations (i.e., so that the samples are additive).  Results are unaffected by the exclusion of these observations.   26
= 819) special items observations, respectively.  Focusing on the test of differences across the 
presentation of special items, special items receiving income statement presentation are less 
persistent for both large special items (difference = –0.09, F-statistic = 2.13) and small special 
items (difference = –0.35, F-statistic = 2.08).  If the small special items are unaffected by “big 
bath” reporting incentives, results for this sub-sample remain consistent with managers using the 
presentation decision primarily for informational reasons. 
 
Partitioning on the Sign and Category of Special Item 
  We now examine the consistency of our results across two additional partitions of the data: 
the sign and category of reported special items.  Regarding the sign of special items, we examine 
if differential persistence exists across the presentation of special items, conditional on their signed 
effect on reported income (i.e., positive special items, or PSI, and negative special items, or NSI) 
(Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002).  Untabulated results reveal consistent directional 
evidence that special items presented in the income statement are less persistent than those 
presented in the footnotes for both positive and negative special items; however, significance 
levels vary depending on the sub-sample employed.  
  Regarding the category of special items, we examine if differential persistence exists 
across the presentation of special items, conditional on the category (i.e., restructuring, write-off, 
and other) (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996).  Untabulated results again reveal consistent 
directional evidence that special items receiving income statement presentation are less persistent 
than those receiving footnote presentation within all three categories of special items.  However, 
significance of these differences again varies depending on the sub-sample.  Overall, this 
sensitivity analysis extends the finding that special items presented on the income statement are   27
more transitory than those in the footnotes, by revealing this difference in persistence exists even 
within the sign and categories of special items.  
 
Consistency Across Alternative Disclosure Media: Press Releases 
  Because managers have multiple avenues for providing information, the presentation 
decision on the income statement may also reflect a disclosure decision in these alternative 
mechanisms, the most common of which are earnings press releases and conference calls.  Due to 
data availability, we focus on earnings announcements.
18  We hand-collect annual earnings press 
releases for a subsample of observations reporting special items to provide a comparative analysis 
of managers’ decision to discuss special items in their press releases relative to their decision to 
present special items on the income statement.  We begin with all observations having special 
items (N = 2,412), retaining only those in which the source of the press release from Factiva is 
either Business Wire (BW) or Press Release Newswire (PRN), leading to 1,514 available 
observations.
19  Due to the cost of hand-collection, we randomly select one-half of the 
observations (N = 762), reading the annual press releases to identify any discussion of the special 
items (i.e., in the headline, text, or any tabulated financial statements).  This will capture (in a 
binary sense) managers’ highlighting of special items in the press release.  Untabulated results 
show a strong positive association between discussion in the press release and income statement 
presentation (correlation = 0.36, probability < 0.001).   
                                                 
18  In particular, an analysis of conference call data relating to the presentation/discussion of special items would 
require availability of transcripts to identify the nature of management discussion regarding these items.  However, 
conference call transcripts are not widely available for most of our sample period.  
19  We impose this restriction to focus our analysis on direct (i.e., unedited) management disclosures.  Press releases 
from other sources (such as Dow Jones or Reuters) may experience editing of the original disclosure with unclear 
implications for our analysis.  Test of means comparing observations with versus without BW/PRN press releases 
reveal no significant differences in either firm (e.g., size, profitability) or special items (e.g., magnitude, income 
statement presentation) characteristics.    28
  We re-estimate a logistic analysis (N = 725), similar to Equation (1), examining the 
decision to discuss the special items in the press release; thus, the dependent variable is 
SI_Sep_PR, defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the special items are explicitly discussed 
or identified anywhere in the annual press release, and 0 otherwise.  Our predicted signs on all of 
the variables are unchanged, with untabulated results similar to those presented in Table 6.  
Among the experimental variables, NSI and MISS_PYE remain positive and significant; and 
SI_PERSIST is negative, but insignificant.  This provides limited support that the determinants of 
the presentation on the income statement are similar to those within the press release. 
 
Subsample Analyses 
  Finally, we examine several subsamples to further validate our inferences.  We first 
examine the subset of observations reporting both PSI and NSI within a fiscal year.  We obtain the 
percentage of observations reporting PSI as a separate line item on the income statement, and 
compare this to the same percentage for NSI using tests of means.  Across a range of cutoffs, we 
find that NSI are consistently more likely than PSI to receive income statement presentation 
(conditional on reporting both).  We then re-estimate Equation (2) (N = 447), finding that PSI have 
higher persistence (coefficient = 0.50, t-statistic = 7.41) than NSI (coefficient = 0.16, t-statistic = 
3.34), with a difference that is significant at the < 1% level.  This corroborates our previous 
finding that NSI are more likely to receive income statement presentation than PSI due to 
informational (versus opportunistic) motivations, as NSI are more transitory even for firms 
reporting both NSI and PSI. 
  Second, we examine the within firm presentation of special items over time, as the 
presentation decision may reflect a one-time disclosure policy choice.  That is, we examine   29
whether firms consistently present special items using either income statement or footnote 
presentation across all sample years in which they report special items, versus changing from one 
presentation method to another.  Untabulated descriptive results reveal that 85% (426) of our 
sample firms report special items in multiple years; of these, most (320, or 75%) change their 
presentation behavior at least once during our sample period.  Overall, this suggests that most 
firms do not follow a sticky presentation decision regarding special items.  We then focus on the 
subset of observations wherein the firm reports a special item for the first time within our sample 
period, allowing us to better isolate the initial presentation decision.  We re-estimate Equation (1) 
with this subsample (N = 448), with untabulated results consistent with those previously reported.  
We also re-estimate Equation (1) for the full sample, now including an additional control variable: 
the presentation of special items in the most recent year having a special item (LAG_SI_Sep).  
Untabulated results are similar to those reported, except INST is of the same sign but no longer 
significant (t-statistic = 1.34); LAG_SI_Sep is positive and significant (t-statistic = 20.60).
20   
  Finally, we examine the subset of firms providing mixed presentation of special items: that 
is, firms reporting some special items using income statement presentation, and some special items 
using footnote presentation.  Re-estimating Equation (1) for this subsample (N = 327), inferences 
are unchanged; similarly, re-estimating Equation (2) (N = 250) reveals that special items receiving 
income statement presentation are more transitory than those receiving footnote presentation.  
Overall, the results of these subsample analyses corroborate our findings that managers appear to 
provide income statement presentation for special items that are more transitory, consistent with 
informational versus opportunistic motivations. 
 
                                                 
20  Note that we do not include LAG_SI_Sep in our primary model, as we are attempting to model the underlying 
determinants of the presentation decision, versus document serial presentation behavior per se.   30
7.  Conclusion  
  This paper examines whether managers’ presentation decisions within the financial 
statements reflect informational motivations (that is, revealing the underlying economics of the 
firm) or opportunistic motivations (that is, attempts to bias perceptions of firm performance).  
Specifically, we examine managers’ decision to present special items separately on the income 
statement (income statement presentation), versus aggregated in other line items with disclosure in 
the footnotes only (footnote presentation).  This analysis is motivated by prior research, which 
provides evidence that managers engage in opportunistic reporting in other presentation decisions 
(e.g., Schrand and Walther 2000; Bhattacharya et al. 2003), as well as evidence that managers’ 
financial statement presentation decisions can affect users’ judgments (Hirst and Hopkins 1998; 
Maines and McDaniel 2000; Libby, Nelson, and Hunton 2005).  It is also motivated by standard-
setters’ interest in performance reporting and financial statement presentation (FASB 2006; IASB 
2006), as well as their movement towards reporting standards likely to increase the occurrence of 
“non-recurring” type charges that are similar to special items, such as fair value changes.   
Overall, our results consistently reveal that special items receiving income statement 
presentation are more transitory than those receiving footnote presentation.  For observations 
reporting special items that are unlikely affected by “big bath” reporting incentives (representing 
over three-quarters of our special items observations), these results are consistent with managers 
using discretion in the financial statement presentation of special items for informational reasons.  
For observations reporting special items likely to reflect “big bath” reporting incentives (less than 
one-quarter of our special items observations), we provide limited evidence that opportunistic 
motivations underlie this presentation decision.  Overall, our results extend the findings of prior 
research examining pro forma reporting by documenting that managers, in most instances, appear   31
to use the flexibility afforded in the presentation of special items to inform users of the underlying 
economics of these items.   
   32
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APPENDIX A  
Frequency and Magnitude of Reported Special Items: 1978 – 2002 
              


































































              


























Absolute Special Items/Total Assets - Economy Wide
Average Special Items/Total Assets - Firm Level
Absolute Special Items (2002 $US billions)
 
              
Notes: 
These figures present the increase in frequency and magnitude of reported special items over time, 
using annual Compustat data.  Panel A presents the percentage of Compustat firms reporting   36
negative or positive special items annually, for the years 1978 – 2002.  Panel B presents the 
magnitude of special items over the same time period, using three annual measures.  The first 
(represented by squares) reflects the scaled economy-wide magnitude of special items, and is 
measured as the absolute reported special items (totaled across all firms) for year t as a percentage 
of lagged total assets (also totaled across all firms).  The second (represented by diamonds) 
presents the scaled firm-level average magnitude of special items, and is measured as the absolute 
annual reported special items divided by lagged total assets for each firm reporting special items, 
and then averaged within a year across those firms reporting special items.  The third (represented 
by triangles) reflects the economy-wide magnitude of special items, and is measured as the 
unscaled total absolute special items across all firms within a year, with all figures shown in $US 
billions adjusted to 2002 levels.      37
TABLE 1   
Sample Selection 






         
Available observations from Compustat Annual, 1993 – 2002      72,473     11,557 
 
Observations designated as S&P 1500 by Compustat 1993 – 2002    14,400 
a       2,466 
 
All available observations for 1993 – 2002 for any firm  
   designated as within the S&P 1500 during the sample period    20,198        2,466 
 
Final Sample: 
  Random selection of 500 firms, including all available 
  years for 1993 – 2002       4,695         500 
              
Notes: 
This table shows the sample selection process.  We begin with all firm-years available on 
Compustat for the period 1993 – 2002, identifying all firms that are within the S&P 1500 at any 
point during this period.  From these firms, we randomly choose 500.  For the 500 firms selected, 
we then include all available firm-years for the sample period, leading to 4,695 observations 
representing 500 firms.   
 
a   Per discussion with Compustat, there are only 900 firms classified within the S&P 1500 for 1993; this 
results in 600 fewer available firm-years than expected (i.e., 15,000 – 14,400 = 600).  
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TABLE 2   
Descriptive Data 
                   
 
 
  N  Unique 
Firms 
Total 
Assetst  NIt  NIt    
(pre SI)  SIt 
|SIt| /  
Total 
Assetst-1 







                 
All Observations  4,695  500  8,449  207  271  (64)  2.5%  64%  36% 
                 
By Existence of SI:                   
   No SI  2,283  477  5,461  171  171  -  -  -  - 
   SI  2,412  475  11,277  241  365  (124)  4.8%  64%  36% 
                 
By Magnitude of SI:                   
   SI ≥ 1% Total Assetst-1 1,279  400  4,951  94  296  (203)  8.3%  76%  24% 
   SI < 1% Total Assetst-1 1,133  500 18,418  408  443  (36)  0.4%  52%  48% 
                 
By Sign of SI:                   
   Only NSI  1,452  451  10,185  202  329  (127)  5.5%  67%  33% 
   Only PSI  349  215  8,419  342  295  46  3.3%  51%  49% 
   Both NSI and PSI  611  267  15,496  277  492  (215)  4.0%  66%  34% 
                 
By Category of SI:                   
   Restructuring  1,108  354  16,764  241  469  (229)  4.8%  74%  26% 
   Write-off  836  359  7,465  76  315  (239)  6.5%  61%  39% 
   Other  1,723  450  11,618  269  399  (130)  5.3%  63%  37% 
                 
By Presentation of SI:                   
   All SI listed separately  
      on income statement  1,335  399  12,265  171  317  (146)  6.1%  100%  0% 
   All SI identified only  
      in footnotes  733  309  9,274  340  383  (42)  1.6%  0%  100% 
   Mixed presentation  344  196  11,687  304  516  (213)  6.5%  64%  36% 
                     39
Notes: 
This table provides descriptive data for the observations used in our analyses.  N is the number of observations.  Unique firms is the 
number of unique firms within each grouping.  We then report means of the following measures.  Total Assetst is end-of-year total 
assets.  NIt is annual net income before extraordinary items.  NIt (pre SI) is annual net income before extraordinary items and special 
items.  SIt is annual net reported special items, measured using hand-collected annual data from firms’ 10-Ks.  The previous four 
variables are denoted in $ millions.  |SI| / Total Assetst-1 is the absolute annual net reported special items divided by beginning-of-year 
total assets.  % SI Income Statement Presentation is the average percent of the absolute total special items (not netted) that are 
presented on the firm’s income statement in a separate line item.  % SI Footnote Presentation is the average percent of the absolute 
total special items (not netted) that are aggregated within another line item on the income statement and identified only via footnote 
disclosure.   
We present the above measures for six groups of observations.  First, All Observations is for the pooled observations.   
Second, we group observations according to the existence of special items: No SI reflect observations reporting no special 
items; and SI reflect those reporting non-zero special items.   
Third, we group observations reporting special items based on the magnitude of total reported special items: SI ≥ 1% Total 
Assetst-1 reflects observations reported where special items are greater than or equal to 1% of lagged total assets; and SI < 1% Total 
Assetst-1 reflects those where special items are less than 1% of lagged total assets.   
Fourth, we group observations reporting special items based on the directional impact on net income: Only NSI reflect 
observations reporting only income-decreasing (i.e., negative) special items; Only PSI reflect observations reporting only income-
increasing (i.e., positive) special items; and BOTH NSI and PSI reflect observations reporting both income-decreasing and income-
increasing special items in the same fiscal year.   
Fifth, we group observations reporting special items based on the category of reported special items: Restructuring reflect 
observations reporting any restructuring charges; Write-off reflect observations reporting any write-offs; and Other reflect 
observations reporting other categories of special items.   
Finally, we group observations based on the presentation of the reported special items: All SI listed separately on income 
statement reflect observations wherein all special items are reported in separate line items on the income statement; All SI identified 
only in footnotes reflect observations wherein all special items are aggregated in other line items on the income statement and 
identified only via footnote disclosure; and Mixed presentation reflect observations wherein some special items are listed separately 
on the income statement and others are aggregated into other line items. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
                   
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics (N = 2,228) 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard  Deviation 
SI_Sep  0.646 1.000 0.455 
YEAR  1998 1999  2.722 
SIZE  7.109 7.091 1.676 
INST  0.681 0.693 0.223 
SI_MAG  0.048 0.013 0.223 
SI_PERSIST  0.218 0.140 0.823 
NSI  0.859 1.000 0.348 
MISS_PYE  0.208 0.000 0.406 
BEAT_PYE  0.039 0.000 0.195 
                   
Panel B:  Correlations (N = 2,228) 
  SI_Sep YEAR  SIZE  INST SI_MAG  SI_PERSIST  NSI MISS_PYE 
YEAR  –0.017            
SIZE  –0.079 
 *** 0.104 
 ***         
INST  0.073 
 *** 0.278 
 *** 0.063 
 ***        
SI_MAG  0.101 
 *** 0.013  –0.099 
 *** 0.009         
SI_PERSIST  –0.070 
 *** –0.055 
 *** 0.021  –0.049 
 ** 0.032       
NSI  0.120 
 *** 0.092 
 *** 0.004  0.085 
 *** 0.025  –0.058 
 ***    
MISS_PYE  0.147 
 *** –0.067 
 *** 0.053 
 ** 0.009  0.082 
 *** –0.035 
 * 0.208 
 ***  
BEAT_PYE  –0.001 –0.025  0.011 -0.066 
 *** 0.077 
 *** 0.025  –0.248 
 *** –0.104 
 *** 
                   
Notes: 
This table presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations (Panel B) for the variables used in the analysis examining 
management’s decision to present special items as a separate line item on the income statement (i.e., income statement presentation) 
versus aggregate them within another line item with identification only via footnote disclosure (i.e., footnote presentation).  The 
sample is comprised of observations reporting special items and having available data for Equation (1) (N = 2,228).   
SI_Sep is the absolute amount of (non-netted) annual special items presented in a separate line item on the income statement, 
divided by the absolute amount of total annual (non-netted) reported special items: thus it ranges in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.    41
YEAR is the year.  SIZE is the log of the firm’s year t sales.  INST is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding common shares owned by 
institutions at year end.  SI_MAG is the absolute value of the total annual (non-netted) special items, divided by the firm’s beginning-
of-period total assets.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter for year t special items on one-year ahead earnings before special 
items; the parameter is calculated by year and industry at the 3-digit SIC level.  NSI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 
reports negative (income-decreasing) special items, and 0 otherwise.  MISS_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the net special 
items cause the firm’s earnings to be below prior year earnings, and 0 otherwise.  BEAT_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
net special items cause the firm’s earnings to be above prior year’s earnings, and 0 otherwise.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Univariate Comparison of Income Statement versus Footnote Presentation of Special Items 
              







Panel A:  All Observations (N = 2,228)  
 ( N = 1,555)    (N = 673)       
 Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median 
SI_MAG  0.062 0.019  0.015 0.005  0.047  *** 0.014  ^^^ 
SI_PERSIST  0.181 0.130  0.304 0.169  –0.123  ***  –0.039  ^ 
              
Panel B:  Big Bath Observations (N = 406) 
 ( N = 352)    (N = 54)       
 Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median 
SI_MAG  0.101 0.058  0.054 0.037  0.047  *** 0.021  ^^^ 
SI_PERSIST  0.121 0.135  0.251 0.024  –0.130  0.111 
              
Panel C:  Non-Big Bath Observations (N = 1,822) 
 ( N = 1,203)    (N = 619)       
 Mean  Median    Mean  Median    Mean  Median 
SI_MAG  0.051 0.013  0.011 0.005  0.040  *** 0.008  ^^^ 
SI_PERSIST  0.199 0.128  0.309 0.169  –0.110  ***  –0.041  ^ 
              
Notes: 
This table presents univariate comparisons of select variables across two groups of observations: 
those in which the firm presents any recognized special items as a separate line item on the 
income statement (“Income Statement Presentation”), and those in which the firm aggregates all 
recognized special items into other line items, with identification only via footnote disclosure 
(“Footnote Presentation”).  Only those observations having sufficient data to estimate Equation 
(1) are included.  Note that observations in which the firm adopts a mixed presentation (N = 395) 
are classified as having “income statement presentation.”  Panel A includes all observations 
reporting special items (N = 2,228).  Panel B includes “Big Bath Observations,” i.e., those in 
which net special items are income-decreasing, total negative special items exceed 1% of lagged 
total assets, and the special items cause the firm to miss prior year’s earnings (N = 406).  Panel C 
includes “Non-Big Bath Observations,” i.e., all other observations reporting special items (N = 
1,822).  SI_MAG is the absolute value of the total annual (non-netted) special items, divided by 
the firm’s beginning-of-period total assets.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter for year t 
special items on one-year ahead earnings before special items; the parameter is calculated by 
year and industry at the 3-digit SIC level.  ***, **, * (^^^, ^^, ^) indicate significance at the less 
than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for two-tailed tests comparing means (medians) 
across observations having “Income Statement Presentation” versus “Footnote Presentation.”   43
TABLE 5   
Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items – OLS Specification 





All      
Observations 
Big Bath   
Observations 
Non-Big Bath  
Observations 
Control Variables: 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
     Intercept     0.59  (10.73) ***  1.01  (10.28) ***  0.55  (  8.96) *** 
     YEAR  + / –  –0.01  (–1.56)   –0.03  (–4.25) ***  –0.01  (–0.02)  
     SIZE  + / –  –0.02  (–3.73) ***  –0.02  (–2.19) **  –0.02  (–2.99) *** 
     INST  + / –  0.16  (  3.56) ***  0.16  (  1.94) *  0.14  (  2.86) *** 
     SI_MAG  +  0.16  (  3.81) ***  0.26  (  1.97) **  0.15  (  3.17) *** 
Experimental Variables: 
   
     SI_PERSIST  + / –  –0.03  (–2.89) ***  –0.03  (–1.27)  –0.03  (–2.47) ** 
     NSI  + / –  0.12  (  4.32) ***    0.12  (  4.03) *** 
     MISS_PYE  +  0.14  (  5.78) ***    –0.02  (–0.34) 
     BEAT_PYE  –  0.08  (  1.67)    0.08  (  1.63) 
       
Adj-R
2  0.051 0.070  0.026 
N   2,228  406  1,822 
              
Notes:  
This table presents results from OLS regressions examining the management decision to present 
special items as a separate line item on the income statement (“income statement presentation”) 
versus aggregate them in another line item with identification only via footnote disclosure 
(“footnote presentation”).  The dependent variable is SI_Sep, measured as the absolute amount of 
(non-netted) annual special items presented in a separate line item on the income statement, 
divided by the absolute amount of total annual (non-netted) reported special items: thus it ranges 
in value from 0 to 1, inclusive.  The column “All Observations” includes all observations 
reporting special items and having available data (N = 2,228).  “Big Bath Observations” includes 
those in which net special items are income-decreasing, total negative special items exceed 1% 
of lagged total assets, and the special items cause the firm to miss prior year’s earnings (N = 
406).  “Non-Big Bath Observations” includes all other observations (N = 1,822).   
The control variables include the following.  YEAR is the year.  SIZE is the log of the 
firm’s year t sales.  INST is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding common shares owned by 
institutions at year end.  SI_MAG is the absolute value of the total annual (non-netted) special 
items, divided by the firm’s beginning-of-period total assets.  The experimental variables include 
the following.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter for year t special items on one-year 
ahead earnings before special items; the parameter is calculated by year and industry at the 3-
digit SIC level.  NSI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports negative (income-
decreasing) special items, and 0 otherwise.  MISS_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
net special items cause the firm’s current year earnings to be below prior year’s earnings, and 0   44
otherwise.  BEAT_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the net special items cause the firm’s 
current year earnings to be above prior year’s earnings, and 0 otherwise.  We exclude NSI, 
MISS_PYE, and BEAT_PYE from column (2) as there is no variation in these variables for the 
“Big Bath Observations” due to the subsample definition.   
t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the less than 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests, respectively.  Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustered by company.   45
TABLE 6   
Determinants of Financial Statement Presentation of Special Items – Logistic Specification 





All      
Observations 
Big Bath   
Observations 
Non-Big Bath  
Observations 
Control Variables:    (1) (2)  (3) 
     Intercept     –0.52  (–3.42) *   2.80  (  8.66) ***  –0.76  (–6.58) ** 
     YEAR  + / –  –0.01  (–0.01)   –0.16  (–6.41) **  0.02  (  0.75)  
     SIZE  + / –  –0.01  (–0.14)   –0.20  (–4.31) **  0.02  (  0.28) 
     INST  + / –  0.75  (10.67) ***  1.89  (  6.34) **  0.57  (  5.59) ** 
     SI_MAG  +  18.25  (67.92) ***  5.52  (  3.80) *  23.55  (62.17) *** 
Experimental Variables:     
     SI_PERSIST  + / –  –0.14  (–5.87) **  –0.20  (–0.98)  –0.13  (–4.50) ** 
     NSI  + / –  0.57  (17.61) ***    0.52  (14.75) *** 
     MISS_PYE  +  0.32  (  4.52) **    0.03  (  0.01) 
     BEAT_PYE  –  0.01  (  0.01)    –0.11  (  0.15) 
       
Wald Statistic  153.09 22.62  105.85 
N   2,228  406  1,822 
              
Notes:  
This table presents results from logistic regressions examining the management decision to 
present special items as a separate line item on the income statement (“income statement 
presentation”) versus aggregate them in another line item with identification only via footnote 
disclosure (“footnote presentation”).  The dependent variable equals 1 if any special items 
receive income statement presentation, and 0 otherwise (i.e., all reported special items receive 
footnote presentation).  The column “All Observations” includes all observations reporting 
special items and having available data (N = 2,228).  “Big Bath Observations” includes those in 
which net special items are income-decreasing, total negative special items exceed 1% of lagged 
total assets, and the special items cause the firm to miss prior year’s earnings (N = 406).  “Non-
Big Bath Observations” includes all other observations reporting special items (N = 1,822).   
The control variables include the following.  YEAR is the year.  SIZE is the log of the 
firm’s year t sales.  INST is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding common shares owned by 
institutions at year end.  SI_MAG is the absolute value of the total annual (non-netted) special 
items, divided by the firm’s beginning-of-period total assets.  The experimental variables include 
the following.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter for year t special items on one-year 
ahead earnings before special items; the parameter is calculated by year and industry at the 3-
digit SIC level.  NSI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports negative (income-
decreasing) special items, and 0 otherwise.  MISS_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
net special items cause the firm’s current year earnings to be below prior year’s earnings, and 0 
otherwise.  BEAT_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the net special items cause the firm’s   46
current year earnings to be above prior year’s earnings, and 0 otherwise.  We exclude NSI, 
MISS_PYE, and BEAT_PYE from column (2) as there is no variation in these variables for the 
“Big Bath Observations” due to the subsample definition.   
Wald Chi-Square statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, * indicate significance at the less 
than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for the indicated one- or two-tailed tests, respectively.  Standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by company. 
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TABLE 7   
Presentation of Special Items and Earnings Persistence 
              
  Model Model Model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  0.02  (  5.19)
 ***  0.02  (  5.32)
 ***  0.02  (  5.45)
 *** 
E*t  0.90  (49.96)
 ***  0.90  (49.74)
 ***  0.89  (49.01)
 *** 
SIt  0.09  (10.42)
 ***    
SI_ISt    0.09  (10.03)
 ***  0.09  (  9.35)
 *** 
SI_FNt    0.26  (  4.37)
 ***  0.18  (  2.37)
 ** 
SI_IS_BATHt      0.04  (  1.49)
 * 
SI_FN_BATHt      0.21  (  1.69)
 ** 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
     
Adj-R
2  0.538 0.539 0.540 
N  3,702 3,702 3,702 
      
F-Test of: 
  SI_IS – SI_FN    –0.17  (8.16) 
∀∀∀  –0.09  (  1.48) 
∀ 
  SI_IS_BATH – SI_FN_BATH    –0.13  (  1.68) 
∀ 
              
Notes:  
This table presents regressions examining the persistence of reported special items in predicting 
one-year ahead earnings.  The dependent variable is Et+1, or earnings for year t+1.  We include 
observations with data available for Equation (2).  We eliminate observations with large 
studentized residuals (representing approximately 1% of total observations) to reduce the effect 
of outliers. 
E*t are earnings before special items for year t.  SIt are reported special items for year t.  
SI_IS (SI_FN) are reported special items for year t, which receive income statement (footnote) 
presentation.  SI_IS_BATH (SI_FN_BATH) are reported special items for year t, which receive 
income statement (footnote) presentation, which also are “big bath” observations.  “Big bath” 
observations are those in which net special items are income-decreasing, total negative special 
items exceed 1% of lagged total assets, and the special items cause the firm to miss prior year’s 
earnings.  Income statement presentation refers to special items, which are presented as a 
separate line item on the income statement.  Footnote presentation refers to special items, which 
are aggregated within another line item and identified only via footnote disclosure.  All variables 
are scaled by beginning market value of equity.   
  ***, **, * represent significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed 




∀ represent significance at the less than 1%, 5% , and 10% levels for one-tailed 
tests comparing differences across coefficients for special items receiving income statement 
versus footnote presentation.  F-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by company.     48
TABLE 8 
Sensitivity Analysis: Partitioning on the Magnitude of Special Items  
              











Control Variables:    (1) (2) (3) 
   Intercept     0.59  (10.73) ***   0.89  (12.91) ***  0.21  (  2.41) ** 
   YEAR  + / –  –0.01  (–1.56)   –0.02  (–4.30) ***  0.01  (  2.22) ** 
   SIZE  + / –  –0.02  (–3.73) ***  –0.02  (–3.12) ***  0.00  (  0.40) 
   INST  + / –  0.16  (  3.56) ***  0.09  (  1.74) *  0.13  (  1.83) * 
   SI_MAG  +  0.16  (  3.81) ***  0.10  (  2.61) ***  11.78  (  2.14) ** 
Experimental Variables:      
   SI_PERSIST  + / –  –0.03  (–2.89) ***  –0.01  (–0.74)  –0.05  (–2.82) *** 
   NSI  + / –  0.12  (  4.32) ***  0.04  (  0.94)  0.07  (  1.75) * 
   MISS_PYE  +  0.14  (  5.78) ***  0.06  (  2.52) ***  0.05  (  0.81) 
   BEAT_PYE  –  0.08  (  1.67)  0.02  (  0.30)  –0.04  (–0.39) 
       
Adj-R
2    0.051 0.032 0.023 
N    2,228 1,228 1,000 
              
Panel B:  Presentation of Special Items and Earnings Persistence 








  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  0.02  (  3.73)
 ***  0.02  (  3.72)
 ***  0.01  (  1.82)
 *  0.03  (  3.33)
 *** 
E*t  0.83  (36.18)
 ***  0.84  (36.27)
 ***  0.78  (24.43)
 ***  0.89  (25.59)
 *** 
SIt  0.13  (  7.48)
 ***     
SI_ISt    0.13  (  6.43)
 ***  0.10  (  4.52)
 ***  0.05  (  0.29)
      
SI_FNt    0.25  (  4.58)
 ***  0.19  (  3.13)
 ***  0.40  (  1.99)
 ** 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R
2  0.445 0.450 0.401 0.485 
N  1,835 1,835 1,016  819 
F-Test of:        
 SI_IS – SI_FN    –0.12  (4.67) 
∀∀  –0.09  (  2.13) 
∀  –0.35  (2.08) 
∀ 
              
Notes:  
This table presents results from sensitivity analyses partitioning the sample into observations 
reporting large versus small special items.  The column “All Observations” includes all   49
observations having available data.  The column “Large Special Items” includes only those 
observations, in which total reported special items are greater than or equal to 1% of lagged total 
assets.  The column “Small Special Items” includes only those observations, in which total 
reported special items are less than 1% of lagged total assets. 
Panel A presents results from an OLS specification examining the management decision 
to present special items as a separate line item on the income statement (“income statement 
presentation”) versus aggregate them in another line item with identification only via footnote 
disclosure (“footnote presentation”).  The dependent variable is the percentage of recognized 
special items receiving income statement presentation (SI_Sep), measured as the annual absolute 
amount of (non-netted) special items receiving income statement presentation, divided by the 
absolute annual amount of total (non-netted) reported special items; thus, the dependent variable 
has a range of 0 to 1, inclusive.  The control variables include the following.  YEAR is the year.  
SIZE is the log of the firm’s year t sales.  INST is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding 
common shares owned by institutions at year end.  SI_MAG is the absolute value of the total 
annual (non-netted) special items, divided by the firm’s beginning-of-period total assets.  The 
experimental variables include the following.  SI_PERSIST is the persistence parameter for year t 
special items on one-year ahead earnings before special items; the parameter is calculated by 
year and industry at the 3-digit SIC level.  NSI is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 
reports negative (income-decreasing) special items, and 0 otherwise.  MISS_PYE is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the net special items cause the firm’s current year earnings to be below 
prior year’s earnings, and 0 otherwise.  BEAT_PYE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the net 
special items cause the firm’s current year earnings to be above prior year’s earnings, and 0 
otherwise.   
Panel B presents results from regressions examining the persistence of reported special 
items in predicting one-year ahead earnings, where the dependent variable is Et+1, or earnings for 
year t+1.  E*t are earnings before special items for year t.  SI_IS (SI_FN) are reported special 
items for year t, which receive income statement (footnote) presentation.  In the latter panel, we 
eliminate observations with large studentized residuals (representing approximately 1% of total 
observations) to reduce the effect of outliers.  All variables are scaled by beginning market value 
of equity.   
  ***, **, * represent significance at the less than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed 




∀ represent significance at the less than 1%, 5% , and 10% levels for one-tailed 
tests comparing differences across coefficients for special items receiving income statement 
versus footnote presentation.  F-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
   Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by company. 